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Abstract Using a simple Cournot duopoly model with differentiated products, this
work studies the firms’ strategic choice of whether to adopt Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) rules. The proposed game-theoretic approach shows that,
depending on the degree of product differentiation and firms’ social concern, dif-
ferent equilibria arise: (1) all firms in the industry follow CSR rules, (2) all firms are
profit-maximising (PM), (3) asymmetric equilibria are present (one CSR firm, one
PM firm), and (4) multiple symmetric equilibria are present. Under Bertrand
competition, universal PM is the unique equilibrium in which the social welfare is
the least desirable: this implies that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, Ber-
trand may appear as welfare dominated by Cournot. This work can help to explain
the widely observed phenomenon, in the real world, of different industries in which
firms’ CSR behaviours are more or less commonly widespread.
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1 Introduction
The increasing presence of firms adopting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
behaviours has been observed worldwide. Indeed, according to KPMG, CSR behaviours
are surely a dominant global business practice: in 2015, 73% of the top 100 companies
surveyed in 45 countries have reported the realisation of CSR activities, demonstrating
an increase of 9 percentage points since 2011, when 64% of the companies surveyed had
issued CRS reports. Moreover, 92% of the 250 Global Fortune Index companies, the
world’s 250 largest companies, have performed CSR actions (KPMG 2011, 2015).
The economic literature has recently tried to offer explanations, usually beyond the
standard short-term profit maximization, to justify the growth of this phenomenon (e.g.
Benabou and Tirole 2010). Nonetheless, it is widely observed that firms adopting CSR
may present extremely different levels of engagement in their ‘‘socially concerned’’
activities; moreover, the simultaneous presence of both CSR and non-CSR firms within
the same industry occurs. For example, according to the Reputation Institute (2015), in
the automotive sector, two German carmakers, BMW and Daimler, rank among the top
10 companies with the best CSR reputation (1st and 3rd place, respectively) with respect
to the Japanese Toyota (35th) and Honda Motor (61st), US companies Ford (65th) and
General Motors (96th), and the absence of the top 100 ranked companies of other giants
in the industry such as French companies Renault and PSA Peugeot Citroe¨n, Korean
manufacturers KIA and Hyundai, and the FCA Group.
This fact is not immediately intuitive and promptly explained. It can be easily
shown (as this work does) that a firm, in most cases, may not have any convenience
in following CSR rules (for example, taking care of the consumers’ welfare),
because profits would be reduced in the case of oligopoly. Hence, if the adoption of
CSR rules is unprofitable, it is puzzling to explain the widespread (although not
universal) presence of a socially concerned firm in several industries (unless not
strictly profit maximizing reasons are considered).
The present paper contributes by providing an explanation in ‘‘strategic’’ terms of
the multi-faceted phenomenon of CSR and complementing the different perspec-
tives already identified in the recent industrial organization literature. One line of
research in economics recognizes CSR as private provision of public goods and
private elimination of a public bad (Bagnoli and Watts 2003; Kotchen 2006; Besley
and Ghatak 2007). A second line of the research has focused on the motives that
lead companies to adopt CSR behaviours (Baron 2001, 2009; Porter and Kramer
2006; Garcı´a-Gallego and Georgantzı´s 2009; Reinhardt and Stavins 2010; Benabou
and Tirole 2010; Lambertini and Tampieri 2010; Kopel and Brand 2012). In
particular, the contributions of Baron (2001, 2009) highlight that companies may
strategically follow CSR rules simply guided by their pure selfishness, where CSR is
a response to social pressure directly exerted by social activists—e.g. such as Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), defined by Baron (2001) as actors in ‘‘private
politics’’—especially through threats (boycotting, negative propaganda) or rewards
(endorsements). Moreover, according to Baron (2009), NGOs can also distinguish
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between morally motivated CSR and CSR induced by social pressure, and thus they
tend to target their campaign against morally managed firms, because they are more
vulnerable to the campaign than the self-interested firms. On the other hand, from
the view of Benabou and Tirole (2010), CSR is a pro-social behaviour resulting
from several interacting motivations, from pure altruism to material motivation,
social and self-esteem concerns. Moreover, as argued by Reinhardt and Stavins
(2010), among others, CSR may be a strategy like any other form of product
differentiation if there are customers—identifiable by firms—willing to pay for
ethical goods which may be profitable: the opportunity arises, for instance, because
of the presence of asymmetric information, economies of scale, intellectual-property
protection, and the successful defense of the resultant niche against imitators,
according to basic economics. More interestingly, Garcı´a-Gallego and Georgantzı´s
(2009) consider the role of the ‘‘pressure’’ exerted by heterogeneous consumers in a
vertically differentiated duopoly with firms’ strategic choice of their degree of
corporate social responsibility. Those authors study the effects of an increase in
consumers’ willingness to pay for products sold by socially responsible manufac-
turers. The consumers’ preferences towards CSR behaviours increase the demand;
however, a trade-off exists because the adoption of CSR rules implies a quadratic
cost. They find that shifting towards socially responsible consumer preferences is, in
most cases, welfare-improving. Conversely, it can be welfare-reducing when such
an increase changes the market structure. Therefore, the above-mentioned literature,
and in particular Garcı´a-Gallego and Georgantzı´s (2009), examine the demand-side
(the consumers’ or NGOs) CSR preferences while the current work focuses on the
supply-side (the firms’) CSR preferences in the sense that supplied quantities are
chosen by firms to maximise also consumers’ interests. Moreover, in a recent paper
to appear in this journal, Fanti and Buccella (2016) investigate the effect that the
incumbent’s CSR adoption can have on a potential entrant decision. On the other
hand, the appearance of universal adoption of CSR behaviours in an industry,
leading to a ‘‘prisoner’s dilemma’’ situation, has been identified by Kopel and Brand
(2012), which seems to be the unique paper dealing with this strategical analysis, to
the best of the authors’ knowledge.
In the current paper, we examine if a correct game-theoretic approach to this
issue may explain the above-mentioned stylised facts; that is, the emergence of
different equilibria in different industries (i.e. all firm adopt CSR rules, all firms do
not follow CSR rules or asymmetric equilibria). Making use of a simple Cournot
duopoly model with identical firms and differentiated products, we show that the
strategic nature of the adoption of CSR rules may explain the occurrence in the
equilibrium of situations in which (1) both firms follows CSR rules, (2) both firms
do not follow CSR rules, (3) asymmetric equilibria in which one firm adopts CSR
while the rival does not, and (4) multiple symmetric equilibria in which both firms
may decide whether to adopt CSR, depending on the degree of product
differentiation.
On the other hand, in the case of a Bertrand duopoly (analysed in the
‘‘Appendix’’), we find that profit maximization is the dominant strategy for firms. In
other words, unilateral deviation from the profit maximisation rule is always
unprofitable for firms. The rationale for this result is rather intuitive: given that
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under Bertrand the nature of competition is in strategic complements, the unilateral
adoption of CSR behaviours (taking care of consumers’ surplus) leads the firm to
produce a larger amount of output than the rival, with a negative impact on the
firm’s price and profits. However, in the presence of strategic complements with
complement goods, if the social concern is not too strong, there is an area in the
parameter space in which the overall adoption of CSR rules payoff-dominates the
profit maximisation equilibrium; that is, firms are cast into a classical prisoner’s
dilemma game.
We find that the adoption of CSR rules always implies a more intensive product
market competition, under both the Cournot and Bertrand conjectures. However, the
role of the product differentiation is crucial. Under Cournot competition, with
substitute goods, the reaction functions have a standard downward sloping shape:
goods are strategic substitutes. In the presence of complement goods, the reaction
functions become upward sloping, and goods behave as when strategic comple-
ments. In both cases, the increasing weight attached to the stakeholder-consumers’
interests leads the socially concerned firms to an aggressive market behaviour via
output expansion, which is stronger with substitute than with complement products.
On the other hand, under Bertrand competition, with substitute goods, the reaction
functions are upward sloping (strategic complements), while with complement
goods, the reaction functions become downward sloping, and goods behave as when
strategic substitutes. Also in these cases, an increase of the social concern level
yields aggressive product market behaviour of the CSR firm through a price
reduction, which is more intense with complements than substitute products. Thus,
these results may be of great interest for the current policy debate on firms’ social
concern.
Concerning social welfare, under Cournot competition, the firms’ strategic
interaction leads to the most desirable welfare outcome1, when the goods are
sufficiently substitutes and sufficiently complements and, in particular, if the level
of social concerns are adequately low. However, while the former case is in contrast
to firms’ interests, in the latter case the firms’ and social interests coincide.
Therefore, when the emergent equilibrium is the best achievable and the interests of
all the agents (both firms, consumers and social welfare as a whole) coincide, the
best achievable outcome can be also defined as the Pareto-superior outcome.
Nonetheless, there is a wide area of the relevant parameter space characterised by
low-medium degrees of goods’ substitutability/complementarity in which universal
1 In this paper, we have carried out a welfare analysis in which we have compared the social welfare
under the three configurations arising from the firms’ game, that is, universal CSR, universal PM or one
firm adopting CSR and one firm profit maximizing. Thus, for simplicity, we have defined, loosely
speaking, the first position in the social welfare ranking as ‘‘the best achievable welfare outcome’’, the
second position in the ranking as the ‘‘second best achievable outcome’’ and, finally, the third position as
the ‘‘third best achievable outcome’’. Notice that, as a referee has pointed out, as long as there is imperfect
competition in the product market, the first best outcome cannot be reached. In this context, the case that
would approach the first best is universal CSR, but only for the particular case in which the parameter
measuring the social concerns is equal to k =1. Finally, we have defined the cases in which the sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between firms is payoff-dominant as Pareto-efficient with respect to
another equilibrium, and when it is payoff-dominated by another equilibrium as Pareto-inefficient.
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profit maximisation arises as endogenous equilibrium, driving the economy to the
third best achievable social welfare outcome.
On the other hand, in the case of Bertrand competition, product market
interactions always determine the rise of universal profit maximisation as
endogenous equilibrium, and this outcome generates the third best achievable
outcome in terms of welfare for a wide set of the parameter space.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
ingredients of the duopoly model, with firms deciding whether to adopt CSR rules.
Section 3 describes the analysis of the game equilibria. Section 4 discusses the
implications in terms of social welfare. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes with a brief
discussion of the main results and an outline of the future research directions.
2 The model
We assume that firms produce heterogeneous goods. As usual, the standard linear
inverse market demand is as follows
pi ¼ a qi  cqj ð1Þ
where p denotes price, qi and qj are the firms’ output levels for i, j = 1, 2 and i = j
and 1\c 1. Note that, if c\0ð[ 0Þ, then products are complements (substi-
tutes) (if c ¼ 0, goods are completely differentiated and each firm is a monopolist
for its own product). For tractability, we assume that both firms have zero pro-
duction costs.2
2.1 Both firms follow CSR rules
Following the recent established literature (e.g. Goering 2007, 2008; Lambertini and
Tampieri 2010), we consider in our model that all social concerns can be interpreted
as part of consumer surplus; thus, the feature of a CSR firm is to be sensitive to it.
Therefore, we suppose that the firm, in its objective, wishes to maximize profits plus
a fraction of the market consumer surplus k, the firm’s social concern or care for
consumer outcomes in the market. Therefore, the stakeholders’ participation in
governance applies regarding market decisions. That is, stakeholders exercise
‘‘pressure’’ with regard to the firm’s objective, while private owners make the
company’s strategic choices. As a consequence, in the current model, the firms’
strategic choice is whether to adopt CSR rules. On the other hand, the stakeholders,
once involved in the firm’s governance, fix the level of social engagement.
Therefore, when a firm decides to be socially responsible, the level of social concern
k is taken as exogenously given by the private owners. In other words, the owners of
the firms can make a binary choice: either k ¼ 0 in the case of profit maximisation
or a given positive k in the case of CSR rules adoption (where k is exogenously
given, for instance, by the customary toughness of the stakeholders incorporated in




the firm’s objective function). This is coherent with the results of the empirical
study of Spitzeck and Hansen (2010), who find that the stakeholder engagement
mechanism is mainly confined to ‘‘dialogue and issues’’ advisory, while the
structural strategic choices (i.e. different from the output choices) of the company
are outside their sphere. Moreover, given that the firms compete for the same clients
in the industry, it can be reasonably assumed that the level of social engagement
stakeholders request is identical for both companies.
It follows that the objective function of the firm following CSR rules can be
specified as a simple parameterised combination of profits and consumer surplus.
Profits and consumer surplus are, respectively:
pi ¼ ða qi  cqjÞqi ð2Þ
CS ¼ ðq
2
i þ q2j þ 2cqiqjÞ
2
ð3Þ
Thus, the CSR objective function (W) is
Wi ¼ pi þ kCS ¼ ða qi  cqjÞqi þ k
ðq2i þ q2j þ 2cqiqjÞ
2
ð4Þ
where k 2 ½0; 1 denotes the weight that CSR firm assigns to consumer surplus.3
The analysis is carried as usual through the maximisation of (4) with respect to
the quantity, which leads to the two reaction functions
qiðqjÞ ¼ a cqjð1  kÞ
2  k ð5Þ
for i, j = 1, 2, and i = j. Solving the system in (5), one gets the equilibrium output
q ¼ a
2  k þ cð1  kÞ ð6Þ
Substituting (6) backwards, we obtain the equilibrium profits4,5
pCSR=CSR ¼ a
2 1  kð1 þ cÞ½ 
2  k þ cð1  kÞ½ 2 : ð7Þ
Note that the satisfaction of the non-negativity constraint on profits requires
ultimately6 that k 1
1þc  kT (that is, the firm’s interest for the consumer’s welfare
3 Goering (2007, 2008) ascribes this objective function also to non-profit organizations (NPO), which
compete in commercial markets, for instance in sectors including university bookstores (Schiff and
Weisbrod 1991), water utility, rail track maintenance company, private air-traffic control organization
(Bennett et al. 2003), and even the high-tech markets (Benz 2005). Thus, commercial NPOs selling their
output and services, which provide them revenues, can be considered CSR firms as well.
4 Henceforth, the first (resp. second) apex denotes the choice of the firm 1 (resp. 2).
5 Note that the values related to the case of profit maximising firms can be immediately derived by setting
k ¼ 0 in the expressions of quantity and profits. For economy of space, those are not reported in the main
text.
6 In fact, it can be easily observed that the equilibrium quantity (6) is positive for any k 2 ½0; 1.
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has not to be too high, especially if there is a fierce product competition). This upper
bound, however, is not relevant in the case of c\0: in fact, when goods are
complements, profits are positive for any k 2 ½0; 1. We assume that this inequality
(which is also the most stringent) holds true for the rest of the paper.
2.2 The asymmetric case: one firm follows CSR rules, while the other is
profit-maximising
Let us consider the case that firm i maximises the social objective function (CSR),
while the rival j maximises profits (PM).
Hence, firm i maximises (4) with respect to the quantity, obtaining the usual
reaction function (5). On the other hand, firm j maximises its profit function (2), and
thus the FOCs for firm j determine the following reaction function:
qjðqiÞ ¼ a cqi
2
ð8Þ
Solving the system composed by (5) and (8) for the firms’ quantities, we obtain
firm i’s output and firm j’s output, respectively:
qi ¼ a 2  cð1  kÞ½ 
2ð2  kÞ  c2ð1  kÞ ð9Þ
qj ¼ a 2  c k½ 
2ð2  kÞ  c2ð1  kÞ ð10Þ
By substituting (9) and (10) in (2), we find the following equilibrium profits of
the mixed case:
pCSR=PMi ¼
a2 2  cð1  kÞ½  c2k  cþ 2ð1  kÞ½ 
2ð2  kÞ  c2ð1  kÞ½ 2 ð11Þ
pCSR=PMj ¼
a2ð2  c kÞ2
2ð2  kÞ  c2ð1  kÞ½ 2 ð12Þ
Now we are in a position to derive which rule (CSR or profit-maximising)
endogenously emerges as SPNE for both firms.
2.3 The role of CSR on firms’ reaction functions
At this point, in the spirit of Bulow et al. (1985), a short digression may provide
further details on the strategic effects that the adoption of CSR rules has on firms’
reaction functions.7
7 As known, according to the pioneering work of Bulow et al. (1985), decisions are strategic substitutes
under Cournot competition and strategic complements under Bertrand competition. Formally, let ai
denote firm i’s action such as quantity or price decisions, and let piðai; ajÞ be the profit function of firm i
when it takes action ai and the rival, firm j, takes action aj. Then, strategic substitutes are defined as
op2i
oaioaj







It is easy to see from the reaction functions (5) and (8) that a socially concerned
firm has an incentive to offer a level of output larger than a profit-maximising firm.
Irrespective of the value of c, as the intensity of the social concerns (k) rises, the
output of the CSR firm expands as well. In fact, the differentiation of (5) and (8)
shows that oqiok [ 0, no matter goods are substitutes (c[ 0) or complements (c\0).
Figure 1 depicts this result. The left box shows the case of substitute goods: the
reaction functions are downward sloping; i.e. we are in the presence of goods which
are strategic substitutes. On the other hand, the right box depicts the case of
complement goods: the reaction functions are upward sloping and the goods behave
as when the strategies are complements. In both cases, the adoption of CSR rules
and the increasing weight attached to the stakeholder-consumers’ interests lead the
firms to demonstrate more aggressive market behaviour through output expansion,
even though the relative aggressiveness is stronger when goods are substitutes than
complements (the output expansion for a given level of k is larger when c[ 0 than
when c\0). As a consequence, the effect of following CSR behaviours is that of
accelerating product market competition, in the vein of the delegation games’ logic
with managers (e.g. Fershtman and Judd 1987).
3 The game analysis
Let us define the following profit differentials:
Fig. 1 Adoption of different levels of social engagement (CSR rules) and firms’ reaction functions. Left
box perfect substitutes (c ¼ 1). Right box almost perfect complements (c ¼ :99). The graphs are drawn
for a ¼ 1
Footnote 7 continued
For instance, CSR represents a commitment on the decision variables which plays a different strategic
role depending on the competition mode, as in the case of forward market: with regard to Cournot
competition, see Allaz and Vila (1993), while for Bertrand, see Mahenc and Salanie´ (2004).
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Dp1 ¼ pCSR=PM1  pPM=PM
¼ a
2kð1 þ cÞ ðk  1Þc4 þ 2c3k þ 4c2  4ck  4k½ 








4ðcþ 1Þ  2c3  c4
ð13Þ
Dp2 ¼ pCSR=PM2  pCSR=CSR
¼
a2kð1 þ cÞ ðk  1Þ2c4  c2ð4 þ 2k2  6kÞ  ðc 1Þð4k2  k3  4kÞ
h i








Dp3 ¼ pPM=PM  pCSR=CSR ¼ a
2kð1 þ cÞ c2 þ cðk þ 2Þ þ k½ 
2 þ k  cð1  kÞ½ 2ð2 þ cÞ2
[
\
0 , k \
[
k
¼  cð2 þ cÞ
1 þ c : ð15Þ
Dp1 describes the gain or loss of being social responsible rather than PM, given that
the rival is PM. On the other hand, Dp2 defines the gain or loss of being socially
responsible rather than PM, given that the rival adopts CSR rules8. Finally, Dp3
describes the gain or loss of the overall PM rule in the industry rather than the
universal adoption of social responsible behaviours.
First, we analyse the usual case of homogeneous product.
Perfect substitutes goods, i.e. c = 1.
Result 1 Given that Dp1 [ 0, Dp2 [\ 0 ¼ 0 for k [\ k ¼ 0:323 and kT  11þc, (1) if
k\k then there exists a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), that is
(CSR, CSR), and since (PM, PM) payoff-dominates (CSR, CSR), it is Pareto-
inefficient, so that a standard prisoner’s dilemma emerges; (2) if k 2 ½k; kT then
there exist two pure-strategy asymmetric Nash equilibria, that is (CSR, PM) and
(PM, CSR), and the game becomes a coordination game. In addition, the
asymmetric equilibrium (CSR, PM) payoff-dominates (CSR, CSR), while (PM,
CSR) is payoff-dominated by (PM, PM).
Proof The proof is directly derived from (1), profit differentials (13), (14), and
(15), and (2) the two pure-strategy asymmetric Nash equilibria follow from the
firms’ payoff structure in k 2 ½k; kT: pCSR=PM1 [ pPM=PM[ pCSR=PM2 [ pCSR=CSR,
while the payoff-dominance of (PM, PM), that is 2pPM=PM[ pCSR=PM1 þ pCSR=PM2 , is
shown by direct comparison.




Almost perfect complements goods, i.e. c = -.99.
Result 2 For whatever values of k, there exists a unique SPNE, that is (CSR,
CSR), and since (CSR, CSR) payoff-dominates (PM, PM), it is also Pareto-efficient
for both firms.
Proof The proof is derived directly from profit differentials (13), (14), and (15).
In the general case of heterogeneous products (i.e. 1\c\1), the following
holds:
Result 3 Given Eqs. (13)–(15) and the condition pi	 0, it is possible to construct
Fig. 2 in the ðc; kÞ-space, which has the following characteristics:
1. In region A, the unique SPNE is PM/PM.
2. In regions B and E, there are two asymmetric SPNE: PM/CSR and CSR/PM.
3. In regions C and D, the unique SPNE is CSR/CSR.
4. In region F, the unique SPNE is PM/PM.
Proof The proof is derived straightforwardly from the following inequalities:9
region A: Dp1\0; Dp2 [ 0; Dp3 [ 0; region B: Dp1 [ 0; Dp2 [ 0; Dp3 [ 0;
region C: Dp1 [ 0; Dp2\0; Dp3 [ 0; region D: Dp1 [ 0; Dp2\0; Dp3\0;
region E: Dp1 [ 0; Dp2 [ 0; Dp3\0; region F: Dp1\0; Dp2 [ 0; Dp3\0.
Fig. 2 Plot of the profit
differentials [Eqs. (13), (14),
and (15)] in the ðc; kÞ-space. The
graphs are drawn for a ¼ 1,
Dp1 ¼ 0 (black solid line),
Dp2 ¼ 0 (red dotted line),
Dp3 ¼ 0 (blue dotted-dashed
line), p1 ¼ 0 (solid green line)
9 For the sake of precision, the analysis of the signs of Dp1 and Dp2 determines the SPNEs, while the
analysis of Dp3 determines the Pareto-efficiency (or inefficiency) of those equilibria, as below
investigated in Result 4.
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The comments to Results 1–3 are simple. First, the rich gamma of equilibria is
determined by a varying degree of product competition. In essence, when goods are
substitutes, the higher (resp. lower) the product competition is, i.e. the higher (the
lower) the value of c, the more likely CSR (resp. PM or even asymmetric and
multiple choices) is the SPNE. The rationale for this result is as follows: from
Sect. 2.3 it is recognized that the higher the level of social engagement, the larger
the output expansion of the firm and, thus, the larger the market share of the CSR
firm with respect to the PM firm. Therefore, with close substitute goods, sufficiently
low levels of CSR engagement favour the emergence of CSR as the SPNE, because
an increasing social concern makes the unilateral deviation from PM increasingly
profitable for a firm; consequently, both firms opt for the adoption of CSR rules.
However, when the value of k is large enough, the firm choosing CSR expands
output at a level such that the rival reduces production to sustain prices and prefers
PM which ensures profits higher than a CSR duopoly; thus, asymmetric equilibria
arise. Finally, combinations of more independent goods and high values of k lead
firms to choose PM. On the other hand, with close complement goods, given the
strategic complementarity, both firms mainly prefer the adoption of CSR rules.
The empirical predictions are that, in industries (1) with very differentiated
products CSR behaviours should be rarely observed, (2) with intermediate values of
the differentiation degree the case of one firm following CSR rules and the other
profit-maximising should be more often found, and (3) at the two extremes of the
substitutes/close complements, the presence of CSR firms should be more often
observed.
While Result 3 provides all of the SPNEs of the game, the following result
provides the welfare properties of such SPNEs:
Result 4 (1) In region A, the SPNE PM/PM is Pareto-efficient. (2) In region D, the
SPNE CSR/CSR is Pareto-efficient. (3) In region C, the SPNE CSR/CSR is Pareto-
inefficient, and the game is a ‘‘prisoner’s dilemma’’. (4) In region B, the asymmetric
equilibrium (CSR,PM) payoff-dominates (CSR,CSR), while the asymmetric
equilibrium (PM,CSR) is payoff-dominated by (PM,PM). (5) In region E, the
asymmetric equilibrium (PM,CSR) payoff-dominates (PM,PM), while the asym-
metric equilibrium (CSR,PM) is payoff-dominated by (CSR,CSR). (6) In region F,
the SPNE PM/PM is Pareto-inefficient, and the game is a ‘‘prisoner’s dilemma’’.
Proof The proof derives directly from Results 1–3 and the following firms’ payoff
structure in region E: pCSR=PM2 [ p
CSR=CSR[ pCSR=PM1 [ p
PM=PM:
The intuition is that, following the interest of stakeholder-consumers means a
more aggressive behaviour on the market; such aggressiveness, provided that it is
not too intense and that the competition is fierce, may be convenient for strategic
reasons for each firm. However, this leads to a typical prisoner’s dilemma situation.
On the other hand, the output of the CSR firm larger than the PM one has a
different effect on the market prices of the two companies. In fact, the negative
impact of the aggressive behaviour of the CSR firm on its own price is higher than
on that of the PM firm, and the degree of product differentiation attenuates this
effect on the latter. Therefore, the presence of areas B and E in Fig. 1 seems to
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suggest that, in those portions of the ðc; kÞ-space the combination of the parameters
is such that one firm finds profitable not to adopt CSR rules, because it may charge a
relatively high price without drastically lowering output levels with respect to the
CSR firm. Conversely, when competition is low and the interest for consumers is
too high, no firm may find profitable to follow CSR rules.10
4 Welfare considerations
Let us consider the welfare effects of the model. The social welfare function (the
sum of the industry profits and consumer surplus) is given by:
SW ¼
X
pi þ CS; i ¼ 1; 2: ð16Þ
Using Eqs. (2) and (3), the relevant expressions of the three configurations CSR/
CSR, PM/PM, and asymmetric regimes are SWCSR ¼ a
2½3þc2kð1þcÞ






A direct analytical inspection reveals the following result.
Result 5 A duopoly in which both firms adopt CSR rules always leads to the best
achievable social welfare outcome.
Proof Simple comparison of the social welfare expressions reveals that, in the
feasible set of the ðc; kÞ-space, SWCSR[ SWAsy[ SWPM .
Given Result 5, Fig. 3 shows the relation between the firms’ game equilibria and
social welfare. A straightforward graphical inspection reveals that universal CSR
arises as the SPNE in regions C and D, and this outcome also represents the best
achievable outcome in terms of social welfare. While in region C universal CSR is
Pareto-inefficient, in region D it is Pareto-efficient for firms. In the former case, the
strategic interactions in the product market drive the result against the firms’
interests; however, the socially best achievable outcome is attained. On the other
hand, in the latter case, when goods are ‘‘very’’ complements, the firms’ strategic
10 In the supplement, we examine the case of the firms’ non-cooperative endogenous choice of the level
of social concern (i.e. the level of k is totally under the control of the firms’ owners and does not depend
on the stakeholders). We find that, in the case of substitute goods, there exists a unique SPNE in which
both firms adopt CSR and, given that PM payoff-dominates CSR, this equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient, so
that a standard prisoner’s dilemma emerges. On the other hand, in the case of complement goods, there
are two pure-strategy asymmetric Nash equilibria, that is (CSR,PM) and (PM,CSR), and the game
becomes a coordination game. In addition, in the case in which the endogenous choice of k depends on
the maximisation of the objective function W , the results are in a certain sense rather trivial. In fact, the
value of the consumers’ surplus dominates that of profits in the function W (a well-known result in the IO
literature in the presence of standard linear demand and technology). This means that the objective
function W is always increasing in the weight of the consumer surplus, and it reaches a maximum
compatible with the non-negativity constraint condition of profits. As a consequence, not only would it be
a convenient an unilateral introduction, but of CSR rules: all firms, in equilibrium, choose to introduce
CSR with zero profits.
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interaction leads to the most desirable welfare outcome, and this is in line with the
firms’ interests.
Regions A and F, in which PM/PM emerges as endogenous equilibrium,
represent the most problematic areas, because product market interactions lead the
economy to the third best achievable social welfare outcome. In fact, the strategic
interactions induce duopolists to select PM; nonetheless, this equilibrium is Pareto-
inefficient, because the universal adoption of CSR would make both firms better off,
and this would be in line with the objective of a social welfare-maximising
government.
These results offer the policy implication that decision makers should pay
attention both to the degree of product differentiation and the level of social
engagement to design the appropriate intervention tools (e.g. mandatory introduc-
tion of quality standards). However, given that the universal presence of socially
concerned firms facilitates the attainment of the highest welfare level the
governments should encourage the overall adoption of CSR rules.11
Fig. 3 Endogenous equilibria and social welfare in the ðc; kÞ-space. The graphs are drawn for a ¼ 1
11 In the case of the non-cooperative endogenous choice of k, the firms’ strategic interaction with
substitute goods leads to the socially best achievable outcome given by universal CSR, although this is in
contrast to the firms’ interests because universal PM payoff-dominates universal CSR. On the other hand,
with complement goods, the firms’ strategic interaction generates asymmetric equilibria which lead the
economy to a second best achievable welfare outcome for a sufficiently large range of c; however, when
the goods are ‘‘very’’ complement, those asymmetric equilibria leads to the most desirable social welfare.




Using a simple two-stage game in which duopoly firms compete a` la Cournot with
differentiated products, this paper investigates the firms’ strategic selection in
adopting CSR rules. To the best of our knowledge, the game-theoretic approach
proposed here is the unique work which shows that, depending on the degree of
product differentiation and firms’ social concerns, in equilibrium, there are
situations in which the following arise: (1) universal adoption of CSR rules: (2)
the presence of only PM firms; (3) the co-existence of a CSR with a PM firm; that is,
an equilibrium in which identical firms engaged in different levels of CSR may arise
as simple effect of the strategic context; and (4) multiple symmetric equilibria.
Therefore, grounded on a game theoretical analysis, this work can help to shed light
on the rationale for the emergence, widely observed in the real world, of various
equilibria in different industries, related to firms’ strategic moves, in which CSR
behaviours are more or less frequently widespread. With regard to welfare, the
firms’ strategic interaction in the product market leads to the adoption of CSR rules
both in the presence of sufficiently high levels of product substitutability/comple-
mentarity, especially when the levels of social concerns are adequately low, driving
the economy to the best achievable welfare outcome. In the former case, this is in
contrast to firms’ interests, while, in the latter, the firms’ and social interests
coincide. However, there exists a wide area in the relevant parameter space defined
by low-medium degrees of substitutability/complementarity among products in
which universal profit maximisation rule emerges in equilibrium, leading the
economy to the less-desirable social welfare level. Moreover, under Bertrand
competition, the SPNE is always universal PM in which the social welfare is the
least desirable: this implies that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, Bertrand
may appear as welfare dominated by Cournot.
These results contribute to the increasing policy debate on firms’ social concerns,
showing the thus-far not fully explored effects of such concerns in shaping the
industry equilibrium. However, those results call for a robustness check under
different model specifications such as the presence of network effects and the
presence of asymmetric and endogenous costs (such as unionised labour costs).
These extensions are left for further research.
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The model with Bertrand competition
From Eq. (1), it is possible to derive the direct market demand
qi ¼ að1  cÞ  pi þ cpj
1  c2 ð17Þ
for i, j = 1, 2 and i = j. Given Eq. (3), when both firms follow CSR rules, sub-
stitution of Eq. (17) into Eq. (4) (in which pi ¼ piqi) and subsequent maximisation
w.r.t. pi leads to the following reaction functions
12
piðpjÞ ¼ að1  kÞ½ð1  cÞ þ pj
2  k ð18Þ
Observing the reaction functions in (18), it can be noted that a socially concerned
firm has an incentive to sell products at a price lower than a profit-maximising firm.
Regardless of the value of c, as k increases, the price of the socially concerned
firm is reduced; the differentiation of (18) reveals that opiok \0 both for substitute
(c[ 0) and complement (c\0) goods.
Figure 4 shows this result. The left box depicts the case of substitute goods: the
reaction functions are upward sloping (strategic complements). The right box
depicts the case of complement goods: the reaction functions are downward sloping.
In this case, goods behave as when the strategies are substitutes. In both cases, the
increasing weight attached to the stakeholder-consumers’ interests by socially
Fig. 4 Adoption of different levels of social engagement (CSR rules) and firms’ reaction functions in
Bertrand competition. Left box perfect substitutes (c ¼ 1). Right box almost perfect complements
(c ¼ :99). The graphs are drawn for a ¼ 1
12 It can be easily verified that the second-order condition of the profit maximisation problem is satisfied.
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concerned firms drives more aggressive market behaviour through price reduction;
however, the relative aggressiveness is weaker when goods are substitutes than
complements (the price reduction for a given level of k is smaller when c[ 0 than
when c\0). Therefore, also in the case of Bertrand competition, the adoption of
CSR rules implies a fiercer competition in the product market.
From (18), the equilibrium prices are
pCSR=CSR ¼ að1  kÞð1  cÞ½2  k  cð1  kÞ ð19Þ
Inserting Eq. (19) into Eq. (17), the equilibrium quantity in Bertrand competition
is13
qCSR=CSR ¼ að1 þ cÞ½2  k  cð1  kÞ ð20Þ
thus leading to the equilibrium profits
pCSR=CSR ¼ a
2ð1  cÞð1  kÞ
ð1 þ cÞ½2  k  cð1  kÞ2 ð21Þ
On the other hand, to get all the relevant expressions when both firms are profit-
maximising, one evaluates Eqs. (17)–(21) at k ¼ 0. Thus, the firms’ profits are
pPM=PM ¼ a
2ð1  cÞ
ð1 þ cÞð2  cÞ2 ð22Þ
Finally, in the asymmetric case, one firm follows CSR and the other is profit-
maximising. As in the main text, let us assume that firm i maximises the social
objective function in Eq. (4) (with pi ¼ piqi), while the rival j simply maximises
profits (k ¼ 0, therefore pj ¼ pjqj). Under these assumptions, after the application of
the usual standard maximisation techniques, one gets the following equilibrium
values:
pi ¼
a½ð2  c c2Þð1  kÞ
½2ð2  kÞ  c2ð1  kÞ ; pj ¼
a½ð2 þ k  c c2ð1  kÞ
½2ð2  kÞ  c2ð1  kÞ ; ð23Þ
qi ¼
að2  c c2Þ
ð1  c2Þ½2ð2  kÞ  c2ð1  kÞ ; qj ¼
a½1  cþ ð1  c2Þð1  kÞ
ð1  c2Þ½2 þ ð2  c2Þð1  kÞ ð24Þ
pCSR=PMi ¼
a2ð1  cÞð1  kÞð2 þ cÞ2
ð1 þ cÞ½2ð2  kÞ  c2ð1  kÞ ;
pCSR=PMj ¼
a2½1  cþ ð1  c2Þð1  kÞ2
ð1  c2Þ½2 þ ð2  c2Þð1  kÞ2
ð25Þ
13 Under Bertrand competition, it can be easily verified that the non-negativity conditions on prices and
quantities are always satisfied in the relevant parameter space.
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Given the outcomes in (21), (22), and (25) and defining the profit differentials
Dp1 ¼ pCSR=PM1  pPM=PM , Dp2 ¼ pCSR=PM2  pCSR=CSR, Dp3 ¼ pPM=PM  pCSR=CSR
as in the main text, one can directly verify that Dp1\0, Dp2 [ 0 and Dp3 [\ 0 ,
k [\ k
T ¼ cðc2Þð1cÞ2 (see also Fig. 5).
14 As a consequence, the following result holds.
Result A.1 Given that Dp1\0, Dp2 [ 0 and Dp3 [\ 0 for k
[
\ k
T (1) simple profit
maximisation is the dominant strategy for firms; therefore, (PM, PM) is the unique
SPNE (2) if k	 kT,(PM, PM) payoff-dominates (CSR, CSR), and the equilibrium is
Pareto-efficient for firm, while, if k\kT, the opposite holds true: the Nash
equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient, so that a standard prisoner’s dilemma emerges.
Therefore, unilateral deviation from the profit maximisation rule is always
unprofitable. The reason for this result is intuitive. Under Bertrand competition,
firms compete in strategic complements. The unilateral adoption of CSR rules leads
the firm to expand output, with negative effects on the price and profits.
Nonetheless, when the degree of complementarity among products is adequately
high and the level of the social concern is not too strong, there exists an area in the
ðc; kÞ-space in which the (CSR, CSR) equilibrium payoff-dominates the (PM, PM)
equilibrium: as such, firms face a classical prisoner’s dilemma situation.
Fig. 5 Plot of the profit differential Dp3 ¼ pPM=PM  pCSR=CSR in the ðc; kÞ-space. The graph is drawn for
a = 1, Dp3 ¼ 0 , kT ¼ cðc2Þð1cÞ2 (black solid line)
14 Further analytical details are available upon request from the authors.
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With regard to welfare, given (19)–(25) and the definition of social welfare in
(16), the expressions of the social welfare under the three configurations CSR/CSR,
PM/PM, and asymmetric regimes are
SWCSR ¼ a
2½3  2c 2kð1  cÞ
ð1 þ cÞ½2  k  cð1  kÞ2 ; SWPM ¼
a2ð3  2cÞ
ð1 þ cÞð2  cÞ2 ;
SWAsy ¼
a2 ð2  kÞð4  3kÞc 2ð1  kÞc2 ð2  kÞcþ ð5  kÞ½  þ 3k2  20k þ 24 
2ð1 þ cÞ 2ð2  kÞ  c2ð1  kÞ½ 2
An analytical inspection reveals the following result.
Result A.2 A duopoly in which both firms adopt CSR rules always leads to the best
achievable social welfare outcome.
Proof Direct comparison of the social welfare expressions reveals that, in the ðc; kÞ-
space, SWCSR[ SWAsy[ SWPM for k kðcÞ ¼ 2ð1cÞð2cÞð2þcÞ
2
2c3ð1þcÞcð11c4Þþ12, while for
k[ kðcÞ, the ranking is SWCSR[ SWPM[ SWAsy.
Given Result A.2, Fig. 6 depicts the relation between the firms’ endogenous
game equilibria and social welfare. The firms’ strategic interactions in the product
market lead to universal PM (see Result A.1), and this outcome represents the third
Fig. 6 Endogenous equilibria and social welfare in the ðc; kÞ-space, Bertrand competition. The graphs is
drawn for a = 1, Dp3 ¼ 0 , kT ¼ cðc2Þð1cÞ2 ; SWAsy ¼ SWPM , k ¼ kðcÞ
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best achievable result in terms of social welfare for a large area of the parameter set.
Therefore, by comparing Figs. 3 and 6, we may observe that the best achievable
welfare outcome is more likely under Cournot than Bertrand. Because CSR emerges
as an equilibrium under Cournot but never under Bertrand, then, in contrast to the
conventional wisdom, Bertrand may appear as welfare dominated by Cournot.
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